TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. The Earlier Dogmatic Philosophies II. The Later Dogmatics III. Scepticism and the Sceptics IV. Text and Editions BOOK I Chapter I Of the Main Difference Between Philosophic Systems Chapter II Of the Arguments of Scepticism Chapter III Of the Nomenclature of Scepticism Chapter IV What Scepticism Is Chapter V Of the Sceptic Chapter VI Of the Principles of Scepticism Chapter VII Does the Sceptic Dogmatize? Chapter VIII Has the Sceptic a Doctrinal Rule? Chapter IX Does the Sceptic Deal with Physics? Chapter X Do the Sceptics Abolish Appearances? Chapter XI Of the Criterion of Scepticism Chapter XII What is the End of Scepticism? Chapter XIII Of the General Modes Leading to Suspension of Judgement Chapter XIV Concerning the Ten Modes Chapter XV Of the Five Modes Chapter XVI Of the Two Modes Chapter XVII Of the Modes by which the Aetiologists are Confuted Chapter XVIII Of the Sceptic Expressions or Formulae Chapter XIX Of the Expression "Not More" Chapter XX Of "Aphasia" or Non-Assertion Chapter XXI Of the Expressions "Perhaps," "Possibly," and "Maybe" Chapter XXII Of the Expression "I Suspend Judgement" Chapter XXIII Of the Expression "I Determine Nothing" Chapter XXIV Of the Expression "All Things are Undetermined" Chapter XXV Of the Expression "All Things are Non-Apprehensible" Chapter XXVI Of the Expressions "I am Non-Apprehensive" and "I Apprehend Not" Chapter XXVII Of the Phrase "To Every Argument an Equal Argument is Opposed" Chapter XXVIII Supplementary Notes on the Sceptic Expressions Chapter XXIX That the Sceptic Way of Thought Differs from the Heracleitean Philosophy Chapter XXX Wherein the Sceptic Way Differs from the Democritean Philosophy Chapter XXXI Wherein Scepticism Differs from Cyrenaicism Chapter XXXII Wherein Scepticism Differs from the Protagorean Doctrine Chapter XXXIII Wherein Scepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy Chapter XXXIV Whether Medical Empiricism is the Same as Scepticism INTRODUCTION I. The Earlier Dogmatic Philosophies The writings of Sextus contain not only an exposition of Scepticism but also a critique of the doctrines of "the Dogmatists." The main task of the Sceptic is, in fact, to expose the folly of every form of positive doctrine; and consequently the bulk of these works of Sextus is controversial. Scattered through his pages there are references to almost every known name in the history of ancient Greek thought, and without some previous acquaintance with the main outlines of that history it is hardly possible to appreceiate the points or estimate the value of his arguments. Accordingly I give here, for the convenience of the reader, a short summary of the history of Greek philosophy. 1. The Ionian Physicists. – Of the School of Miletus the founder was Thales (c. 600 B.C.). He declared that the fundamental substance of which the world was made is water. His successor, Anaximander (c. 570 B.C.), described that substance as "the boundless," since out of it were formed "countless" worlds. He regarded this primitive stuff as being in itself indeterminate, or of no one definite quality, and evolving into the forms of earth, fire, etc., by a process of "separation" of hot from cold, moist from dry, etc. also he called his primal substance "divine." Anaximenes (c. 540 B.C.), like Thales, took one definite element as his primary matter, but chose air, or vapour, instead of water. He explained the passage of this in other forms of matter as due to a process of "condensation and rarefaction." 2. Heracleiteans and Eleatics. -- In chronological order the first of the Eleatic School, Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 520 B.C.), comes before Heracleitus. He was less a philospher than a religious reformer who declaimed against traditional mythology and preached a pantheism which identified the One Universe with God. As against this Unity of the Eleatic doctrine, which precludes diversity, Heracleitus of Ephesus (c. 490 B.C.) declared that things are never one and the same but continually changing. Reverting to the view of the Milesians, he looked for one primary world-substance and found it in fire; this, as being also mind-stuff, he called "Reason" and God. By a kind of circular process ("the upward and downward way") the primal fire passes through the forms of air, water and earth, and returns to its own nature again. The World is "a harmony of opposites," since "War is father of all and king of all," and conflict lies at the heart of things. "All things are in flux," and since things have no permanent identity the reports of our senses are delusive, and opposite statements about an object may be equally true or false. In fact, to the eyes of God, life and death, good and evil, and all opposites are identical – there is no dividing line, and they are for ever passing into one another. Thus, as a Dogmatist who dissolves all dogma, Heracleitus is acclaimed by the Sceptics as one of the pioneers of their tradition.(Cf. Pyrr. Hyp. I. 210 ff.) Parmenides of Elea (c. 470 B.C.) defended the unitary doctrine of Xenophanes as against the flux doctine of Heracleitus. In his view "only Being is," and change, motion, and Becoming are illusions. The World is a single self-contained Sphere, uncreated and imperishable. In his great poem "On Nature" Parmenides calls this "the Way of Truth;" but he follows it up by an account of the World and its constituents on the lines of current physical Science (especially that of the Pythagoreans) which he calls "the Way of Opinion," without giving any explanation of how the one "Way" can be related to the other. Zeno of Elea (c. 450 B.C.) supported the doctrine of the Unity of Being by attacking the notions of multiplicity and motion. These notions, he argued, are self-contradictory. As against the possibility of motion he is said to have evolved the arguments known as "The Achilles" (an the tortoise) and "The Flying Arrow." The kernel of his reasoning is that any quantum (as of space or time) must be regarded either as consisting of a plurality of indivisible units or as itself divisible ad infinitum; but in the latter case, how can the sum of infinite parts make up a finite whole? and in the former, the unitary parts of the quantum must themselves be quanta or magnitudes, and as such they cannot be indivisible. Melissus, the Samian admiral (c. 440 B.C.), likewise taught that Being is One, infinite, uncreate and everlasting, motionless and without void. Thus, in spite of their metaphysical dogmatism, the Eleatics were akin to the Sceptics in so far as they rejected the evidence of the senses and criticized the ordinary belief in the phenomenal world. 3. Fifth-century Pluralists. – Hitherto the Cosmologists had attempted to explain the World by assuming either the Unity of its primal substance or its Unity as a static Totality (the Eleatics). And a direct contradiction had arisen between the position of Heracleitus ("All is in motion") and that of Parmenides ("All is at rest"). We come next to a number of theorists who – though otherwise divergent – agree in adopting a plurality of primary substances or principles to explain the world. Also, in relation to the opposing views of Heracleitus and Parmenides, they take up a mediating position. Empedocles of Agrigentum (c. 450 B.C.) assumed as primary indestructible substances "four roots of all things," viz. the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water. He explained all Becoming and change as due to the mixing and unmixing of the elements. As the motive forces effection these opposite processes he assumed the two rival powers Love and Hate, or Harmony and Discord, which oust each other alternately from control of the World. When Love is in full control, all the "roots" are fused together in a compact mass forming the "Sphere," which he terms "a blessed god." When Hate is in full control, all the "roots" are completely separated, each massed apart by itself. But in the world as we know it both forces are in play, so that its constituents are neither wholly in union nor wholly in disunion. The nature of particular things depends upon the proportion of the "roots" of which they are composed. As regards knowledge, Empedocles declared that "like is known by like," fire and water in the eyes (for example) perceiving the fire and water in the objects of sight by means of effluences. He also regarded the blood as the seat of intelligence, it being the best mixture of all the elements. And he shared the Pythagorean belief in the transmigration of souls, saying that he himself had in times past been "a bush and a bird and a mute sea-fish." Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 450 B.C.) lived mostly at Athens, where he was intimate with Pericles and Euripides, until he was condemned on a charge of atheism and escaped to Lampsacus. Like Empedocles, he held that becoming and change are due to composition and decomposition of primary indestructible substances: "Nothing becomes and nothing perishes." But the primary substances ("seeds of all things") are not merely four but numberless, all existing forms of matter (bone, hair, gold, etc.) being equally ultimate. Originally "all things were together," in a chaotic mass of all kinds of matter, then "Reason (Nous) came and set them in order." That is Anaxagora’s most important contibution to philosophy – the introduction of Reason or Intelligence as the Moving Cause and the principle of order and harmony in the world. He described Nous as alone "unmixed," and ordering the mixed mass of the world by setting up in it a vortex motion which disintegrated the mass and unites like "seeds" of matter with like. Leucippus of Miletus (?), the first Atomist, was probably a contemporary of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, but we know little that is definite about him. His views were developed by Democritus of Abdera (c. 420 B.C.). He held that the World is made up of "the Full" and "the Empty," i.e. of solid, indivisible molecules of matter, the atoms, and empty space or void. The atoms differ only in size and shape, and the forms and qualities of visible objects depend on their atomic structure. The atoms are supposed to rain down through space and collide with one another owing to the differences in the speed of their movement, their speed varying in proportion to their size. As against Anaxagoras’s doctrine of Nous, the Atomists spoke of "necessity" as the governing force of the World, allowing only mechanical causation. Sensation was explained as due to the reception through "pores" of "images" projected from the atoms of the object perceived; but the apparent qualities of objects have only "conventional" reality, the only true reals being the Atoms and the Void. No clear distinction is made between sense and thought, and we can make no assertion about the truth of sense-objects, since these depend on the state of the percipient and the arrangement of the atoms of which he is composed. Belief in gods is due to the "images" projected by certain anthropomorphic beings who dwell in the air. Knowledge is of two kinds, "genuine" and "bastard," the latter being that derived from the senses, the former that of the understanding which discerns the real existents, the atoms and the void. Democritus appears also to have named "Well-being," or tranquil cheerfulness, as the ethical "end" or "good." The relation of Democriteanism to Scepticism is discussed by Sextus in Pyrr. Hyp. i. 213 ff. The Pythagoreans. – Pythagoras (c. 530 B.C.) was a contemporary of Xenophanes, born at Samos, but mainly resident at Crotona in South Italy. There he founded a religious Order, and a Way of Life akin to that of the Orphics in its asceticism, its belief in re-incarnation, and its precepts for the salvation of the soul from its "body-tomb." But nothing is known of Pythagoras himself as scientist or philosopher, and as a philosophy Pythagoreanism seems to date from the fifth century, its chief exponent being Philolaus (c. 440 B.C.). Thus Pythagoreanism is, in the main, contemporary with the other "pluralist" systems mentioned above. The chief subjects cultivated by the Pythagoreans were mathematics, music, medicine and gymnastics. Their main tenet was "Things are numbers," or "The principle of things are the principles of numbers." And, as all numbers are either odd or even, the world is made up of opposites, which can be arranged in ten classes. Even numbers are always divisible by 2 and so are named "Unlimited"; and 1, being the primary odd number, may be called the "Limit." Regarded geometrically, 1 is the point, 2 the line, 3 the plane, 4 the solid. They called 10 (the Decad) the perfect number, as being the sum of the first four numbers ("the Tetractys") and thus containing all the elements of number. "Harmony" is the principle which unites opposites and resolves cosmical as well as musical discords. The Universe consists of ten bodies (the heaven of fixed stars, the five planets, moon, sun, earth, "counter-earth") revolving around the "central fire" or cosmic "hearth;" it is surrounded by air which it breathes in and out. Its life lasts for a "Great Year" (10,000 years), at the end of which it starts anew on the same course; and in every such period history repeats itself. Soul was defined as a harmony, and the virtues identified with special numbers. 4. The fifth-century Sophists. – While the thinkers hitherto mentioned dealt with the world of Nature, the group known as "Sophist" were chiefly concerned with Humanity. It was "the Age of Enlightenment" in Greece when old beliefs and customs were being challenged by a new spirit of doubt and inquiry. With the rise of democracy every citizen became a potential politican, and instruction to fit men for public life was in general demand. This demand the Sophists laid themselves out to supply. They were the professional Educators of the public, and what they taught was "Virtue," as they called it, i.e. civic excellence, and the arts which enable a man to succeed in life. And since, for a political career and to achieve success in law-courts, debating power is of supreme inportance, the art of Rhetoric is the most useful aid to "Virtue"; and we find that the Sophists cultivated it in particular. The earliest of the sophist was Protagoras of Abdera (c. 440 B.C.) who resided for some time at Athens until he was convicted of impiety and had to flee. He is chiefly noted for his dictum – "Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that is not" (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 216 ff.). This means that the individual man is the criterion of truth, and denies that there is any universal standard or any absolute truth. The subjective impressions of each man are true for him, but not necessarily for anyone else. Hence, all opinions are equally true, and falsehood has no meaning, and contradictory statements are both equally credible. But to reject objective truth is also to reject the possiblity of knowledge, and this consequence of Protagoreanism was futher developed by the second great Sophist, Gorgias of Leontini (c. 440 B.C.). His book "on the Non-ent or Nature" essayed to prove (1) that nothing exists; (2) that if anything exists it is incognizable; (3) that even if cognizable it is incommunicable (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. ii. 59, 64). In this we see the strongest possible expression of the agnostic tendency and a Scepticism more dogmatic than that of the professed Sceptics of a later age. Another important Sophist was Hippias of Elis, the "polymath," who boasted of his ability to give an extempore lecture on any subject, and (like other Sophists) contrasted "law" or convention with "nature" or instinctive impulse. Of Prodicus of Ceos we are told that he specialized in linguistics, the precise use of synonyms, and ethical discourses. Other Sophists of the eristic type, who helped to undermine religious belief and to promote intellectual anarchy, were Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Critias the Athenian (one of "The Thirty"), and Diagoras of Melos. 5. Socrates and the Minor Socratics. – Socrates (469 – 399 B.C.) was the contemporary of the Sophists and so far akin to them that he held that "the proper study of mankind is man," and was humanist rather than a physicist. But his aim was exactly the reverse of theirs – to establish morality on a sound basis, instead of proclaiming the futility of the moral law. By means of the inductive method and definition he sought to build up a system of conceptual knowledge which should possess objective truth, as contrasted with the merely subjective opinions derived from sense-perception. As an ethical teacher he preached "well-doing," or right conduct, as the aim of life, and urged self-knowledge and self-control as things more valuable than any external goods, his distinctive doctrine being that of the identity of knowledge and virtue, and of vice and ignorance; for " no man," he said, " is voluntarily wicked." But there is much uncertainty about the details of the teaching of Socrates, since the "Socrates " of the Platonic dialogues is by no means always "the historic Socrates," and the evidence of Xenophon (our other chief authority) does not appear to be altogether trustworthy. Four "Minor Socratic" Schools were formed by the disciples of Socrates. Eucleides of Megara founded the Megaric School in which, it would seem, Socratic tenets were combined with Eleatic doctrines, and the indirect method of proof was developed. Its interest was mainly in logic and dialectic; and to Eubulides (Eucleides' successor) is ascribed the invention of many logical puzzles (" the Liar," Sorites, etc.). Curiously enough, although Sextus often refers to Diodorus Cronos (circa 300 B.C.), he hardly mentions the earlier Megarics, although many of the Sceptic arguments must have been borrowed from them. The Elean School was founded by Phaedo of Elis, whose teaching seems to have resembled that of Eucleides. It, too, is not referred to by Sextus. Antisthenes founded the Cynic School. It subordinated logic and physics to ethics. Virtue, said Antisthenes, is the only good, all else is indifferent and of no account. Virtue is wisdom, self-control and self- sufficiency: the wise man cuts himself free from all earthly interests-pleasure, society, religion; he stands secure in himself, above all temptation. And, as in their Ethics, so in their Logic the Cynics stood for individuality and independence. Only identical judgements, they said, are possible; contradiction is impossible, and therefore knowledge equally so. Thus they reverted to the Sceptical position of Protagoras and Gorgias. Other notable Cynics were Diogenes (circa 340 B.C.), famed for his blunt coarse speech and his contempt for civilized customs, and Crates (Cf.Pyrr. Hyp. i. 72, 153). The Cyrenaic School was founded by Aristippus of Cyrene, who was succeeded by his daughter Arete, and she by his grandson Aristippus. Later members of the School were Theodorus "the Atheist," Anniceris, Hegesias ("the suasor mortis"). Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics concentrated on Ethical theory. The summum bonum, they said, is Pleasure, and pleasure consists in "smooth motion," pain being "rough motion," and the neutral state " immobility." These are the three states of consciousness or psychic "affections" in which sensation consists and to which knowledge is confined. As the causes of these internal states are unknown, knowledge is wholly subjective, and each individual is his own standard of truth --the Protagorean position again. As the end of life is to gain from it the maximum of pleasurable sensations, the "Wise Man" of the Cyrenaics is he who best knows how to secure enjoyment from all possible sources, and to ward off discomfort and pain. Like the Cynics, the Cyrenaics stood for "nature" as against "convention," but they interpreted nature in a very different way (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 215, Adv. Log. i. I 1). 6. Plato and the Old Academy.-The philosophy of Plato (427 - 347 B.C.) defies a brief summary. Only a few outstanding points can be mentioned. As against the Sophists, he maintained the possibility of knowledge, and the existence of an objective standard of truth; and by identifying the "natural" with the "rational" he suppressed the Sophistic appeal from "law," or convention, to "nature." His theory of knowledge and of Being may be said to be based on a reconciliation of the rival doctrines of Heracleitus and Parmenides. Heracleitus was right in regarding the sense-world as being in a state of continual flux and therefore not a subject of knowledge, but he was wrong in treating it as the only world. Parmenides, too, was right in holding that the world as known must be changeless and self-identical, but he was wrong in trying to force this conception on the phenomenal world. There are, in fact, two distinct worlds and two distinct kinds of apprehension to deal with them. Sensation tells us of the phenomenal and gives rise to "opinion;" Reason and thought deal with objects supersensible. For the content of his "intelligible" world Plato is indebted to Socrates' theory of concepts. The general (Aristotelian) view is that by "hypostatizing" these concepts he framed his "Ideas." He presents the Ideas as the ultimate Realities, the only objects of knowledge in the strict sense. The logical method which deals with the Ideas is "Dialectic," which combines induction with deduction. The supreme Idea is "the Good." In the physical theory of the Timaeus, the "Demiurge" (God, or Mind) frames the Universe with a view to the most Good, by means of harmony and proportion. Ethics is interwoven with psychology; the soul is a whole with three component parts or faculties (rational, spirited, appetitive), and is defined as "the self-moving" -- the source of all motion. Virtue is the "goodness" of the soul both as a whole and in each of its parts -- so that virtue is fourfold (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice). Virtue in the State corresponds to that in the individual -- each class must be efficient and loyal, and all together must be united in harmony. Thus Plato's Idealism contemplates the rule of Reason, acting for " the Best," in all three spheres -- that of the Individual, of the State, and of the Universe. How far it contains a Sceptical element is discussed in Pyrr. Hyp. i. 221 ff. Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, succeeded him as Head of the Academy (347 - 389 B.C.) and was in turn succeeded by Xenocrates (339 - 314 B.C.). Both seem to have amalgamated Idealism with the Pythagorean doctrine of Numbers. Polemo (314 - 270 B.C.) was the next Head of the School. Other noted members, or allies, of the Academy were Heracleides of Pontus, Philip of Opus, Eudoxus of Cnidus, the astronomer, and the Pythagorean mathematician Archylas of Tarentum. The general character of their teaching, was, it seems, in the direction of lowering the standard of the Idealism of Plato and adapting it to the interests of inferior minds. The most gifted of Plato's disciples was undoubtedly Aristotle, the man who deserted the Academy to found a rival school of his own and to teach a revised Platonism. 7. Aristotle and the Peripatetics (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. iv. 31, 136, 218). -- Aristotle of Stageira (384 - 322 B.C.) joined the Academy in 367 B.C., and after Plato's death, about 335 B.C., founded a School of his own in the Lyceum at Athens, lecturing as he walked about -- whence the name "Peripatetic" ("walking round"). Aristotle was the great systematizer in all branches of philosophy and science. In his Logical treatises ("Organon") he formulates the "Categories," or ten heads of predicables; the rules for the conversion of propositions; the doctrine of the Syllogism, as based on the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle; the meaning of Demonstration or Proof as concerned with necessary causes, and how First Principles, or axiomatic truths, are indemonstrable; problematic or imperfect syllogisms; the various kinds of eristic argument or fallacy. In his Metaphysics he argues, as against Plato, that the Universals, the objects of knowledge, are not separate from the sensibles but in them. The first principles of Being are actuality and potency; and Cause is analysed into four kinds -- material, formal, efficient and final. Form is the essence of things, and the object of cognition, and Form plus Matter compose the concrete substance. God is pure actuality, "thought thinking upon thought," the primum mobile. In his Physics and Psychology he postulated Ether as a fifth element, and the Earth as stationary in the centre of the Cosmos. Life is the power of self-movement, of which Soul is the principle, it being the "form" or "entelechy" of the body. The faculties of Soul are five -- nutritive, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, rational. In sensation we receive "the form without the matter" of the percept; and besides the five external senses, each with its proper object, there are three internal senses, memory, imagination, and the central communis sensus, with its seat in the heart, by which we note and compare the several reports of the special senses. As the senses deal with the concrete and individual, so the Intellect deals with the abstract and universal; but though distinct from Sense it is dependent on it for its material, being of itself a tabula rasa. The intellect is also described as twofold, active and passive. His Ethics is chiefly notable for his doctrine of Virtue as consisting in "the Mean" between two extremes, and for his preference of mental to moral virtues. Also, he included bodily goods (health, wealth, pleasure) as well as virtue in his description of the ethical " End ("Happiness"). In his Political Theory he rejects Plato's communism and abolition of private property, and regards the State as a means for the moral advancement of the citizens and as the guardian of justice. He also wrote treatises on biology and aesthetics and rhetoric. Theophrastus was Head of the Peripatetic School from 322 to 287 B.C., when he was succeeded by Strato, and he in turn by Lyco (269 - 225 B.C.). They, and other leading Peripatetics -- such as Dicaearchus, the Historian, and Aristoxenus, the musician -- cultivated the special sciences rather than the metaphysical and logical aspects of Aristotelianism, and empirical interests tended to outweigh theoretical in the later history of the School. Back to Table of Contents II. THE LATER DOGMATISTS On its theoretical and constructive side the philosophical movement which culminated in the architectonic systems of Plato and Aristotle came to an abrupt end. The philosophic Epigoni of the post-Aristotelian age showed less breadth of vision and but little originality of mind: the glory had departed from Israel. This was, no doubt, partly due to the depressing social and political conditions which prevailed in the Greek-speaking world during the third and following centuries. These conditions tended to make men concentrate their thoughts on purely human interests -- the welfare, destiny, salvation of the individual -- to the neglect of the other departments of philosophy and science. In so far as they were cultivated at all, those other departments came to be treated merely as the handmaids of Ethics, thus reviving the mainly humanistic attitude of the Sophists. Philosophy, in fact, became the substitute for an out-of-date and exploded Religion, and had for its aim, not the attainment of objective truth, but the provision of a subjective spiritual salvation from the manifold ills of life. Its task was no longer theoretical, but the very practical and urgent one of supplying distressed humanity with "arms against a sea of troubles," with shield and buckler against "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." Truth was now a matter for the heart rather than the head; philosophy, like faith, was to be judged by its "works;" it was bound to be pragmatical. To meet this situation two great Dogmatic systems were evolved, the Epicurean and the Stoic, and, to counter them, the system of the Sceptics. These three were contemporaneous, all dating from the end of the fourth century B.C. 1. The Epicureans. -- Epicurus of Samos (341 - 270 B.C.) founded his School in his garden (hence "the Garden School") at Athens in 306 B.C. Epicurus reverted to Democritus for his Physics, and to Aristippus for his Ethics, being both an Atomist and a Hedonist. In his physical theory he followed Democritus closely, except in explaining the collision of atoms as due to slight arbitrary deviations from the straight line in their downward course. The Soul, he said, is material, composed (as are the gods) of a finer sort of atoms, and mortal. Sensation, with its immediate evidence, is the only criterion of truth; it is effected by effluent images from the external objects impinging on the sense organs. The aggregation of several sensations forms the notion or concept, and from notions arise opinion and conviction. This theory of knowledge constitutes "Canonic," the Epicureans' name for Logic. Physics and Logic were regarded as subordinate to Ethics, and in Ethics Epicurus, like Aristippus, held that the Good is Pleasure, but he defined pleasure rather differently -- not as a satisfying "smooth motion" but as a state of rest, "painlessness," or absence of all unsatisfied desire, or "unperturbedness." Also he regarded freedom from mental distress, fear and prejudice, as even more important than bodily satisfaction; and it is the task of the "Wise Man" by means of a kind of hedonistic calculus, to estimate the comparative value of the different kinds of pleasurable affections so as to win for himself the maximum of mental satisfaction and repose throughout his life. Virtue, and the special virtues, are of value only in so far as they contribute to this end. Right and wrong become matters of merely subjective feeling. Religion was abolished as the cause of intolerable mental "perturbation," and the gods were banished to the intermundia. Lucretius's great poem De Rerum Natura is our most complete exposition of Epicureanism. 2. The Stoics. – Zeno of Citium, in Cyprus (350 – 258 B.C.), started his School about 305 B.C. in the "Painted Porch at Athens -- whence the name "Stoic." He was succeeded by Cleanthes, author of the famous "Hymn to Zeus," who, in turn, was followed by Chrysippus of Cilicia (280 - 206 B.C.), who systematized the doctrines of the School. With Panaetius of Rhodes (180 - 111 B.C.), Poseidonius of Apamea (130 - 46 B.C.), and the later Stoics, the system tended to become more eclectic, with infiltrations of Peripatetic and Academic doctrine. The main tenets of Stoicism were briefly these :-- In Physics they reverted to Heracleiteanism, and taught a materialistic monism. All that exists is corporeal: only body can act on body, therefore God is as much corporeal as the world, the soul as the body. The primal world-stuff is Fire, which by the "upward and downward way" transforms itself into the other elements and produces the Cosmos, until finally, at the end of the "Great World-Year," it returns to its original form in the World-Conflagration; and this cyclical process of evolution goes on for ever. This primary matter has two aspects, active and passive: as "artistic fiery vapour" it is the Soul of the World, Reason, Thought, Destiny, God. Hence the World, though wholly material, is rational: because governed and permeated by logos (the divine "Word") it exhibits order, harmony and beauty, as the artistic products of creative design. But the Logos is also the Cosmic Law, which binds all things in ihe rigid nexus of cause and effect, the bonds of Destiny. Hence, too, there can be no freedom of the Will for the individual. The Divine Logos contains all the "seminal Logoi," which are the active reproductive principles in all living creatures. Of the four elements, fire and air were contrasted as "active" with earth and water as "passive," and the forms and qualities of things were explained as due to the action of air or "aeriform tension." The unity of inorganic objects was ascribed to "condition," of plants to "nature," of animals to "soul." The souls of living creatures are parts of the Cosmic Soul, and consist of hot vapour or "spirit." Human souls (or at least those of the Wise) persist after death until the Ecpyrosis. The Soul has eight parts or faculties, viz. the five senses, the vocal, the generative, and the hegemonic or ruling. To this "Regent Part" all the rest are attached, it being their source of motion, with its seat in the heart, whence the pneuma radiates to the various local organs. It is in the "Regent Part," too, that perception (presentations and impulses) takes place. For their Logic the Stoics were mainly indebted to Aristotle. They subdivided Logic into Rhetoric and Dialectic. All knowledge comes through the senses, the mind being a tabula rasa upon which sense-impressions are made. The "presentation" is defined as "an affection arising in the soul" or "an impression on the soul" (Zeno) or "an alteration in the soul" (Chrysippus). Of these presentations some come through the senses, others are mental. How are we to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy presentations? What is the Criterion of truth? Here we come to the most distinctive feature of the Stoic doctrine. The Criterion, they said, is to be found in the subjective reaction of the percipient. If the presentation is true, proceeding from a real object, it wins the "assent" or approbation of the percipient: such an "apprehensive presentation" constitutes the Criterion. In the development of knowledge they distinguished four stages – sense-perception, memory or retained presentation of an absent object, experience formed by a plurality of like memories, notions. "Notions" may be either involuntary -- termed "common notions" or "concepts" -- or voluntary, due to the reflex action of the mind. The "concept" is defined as "the natural notion of universals." The reasoning faculty deals with "notions," and all notions, as substances, are corporeal. The concepts were classified under four heads, the Stoic Categories, viz. substance, essential quality, accidental quality, relation. These they called "highest universals" or summa genera, and of these the first is also termed Being. In order to include also Non-being, another, still higher, category was postulated -- " Something." All qualities, as gaseous currents, are corporeal; but essential or intrinsic qualities or "states" are distinguished from imported or accidental qualities or "conditions." Under "relation'" are classed all attributes which imply a connexion between co-existing objects. In their Ethics the Stoics followed the Cynics, declaring Virtue to be the only Good, and presenting, the Ideal "Sage" as the embodiment of virtue. Like all the post-Aristotelian Schools they regarded Ethics as the crown of their philosophy to which Physics and Logic were merely adjuncts, since Ethics deals with the one thing needful -- human happiness and the rules for its attainment. Happiness – the End or Good -- they defined as "Living in conformity with Nature," or without contravening the Cosmic "Law" which is Right Reason, which means obeying God or Necessity. This subjection to the Law of the Logos is ultimately unavoidable, since "volentem fata ducunt, nolentem trahunt." Action in accordance with "Nature" is Virtue, which does not admit of increase or decrease and is termed a "disposition" rather than a "state." The four virtues -- wisdom, temperance, justice, courage -- are defined as four forms of knowledge. Between the extremes of virtue and vice there is no middle state; but an important distinction was made between three classes of conduct -- perfect moral actions, "becoming" actions or "duties," "undutiful" or sinful actions. The first kind is peculiar to the Stoic "Sage," the second proper for those "progressing" towards wisdom. As the only "goods" are the virtues and the only "evils" their opposite vices, there is a large class of things which come under neither of these heads: these "neutral" things -- such as life, health, wealth, beauty, pleasure, and their opposites --- are, strictly speaking, "indifferent." But, even so, they differ in value and were divided into two classes, "the desirable and preferred," and "the undesirable and unpreferred." Non-rational affections are the "passions" or emotions of which there are four kinds -- one being of the body, viz. involuntary sensuous feeling, and the other of the soul, viz. the rational emotion of the Sage, natural and involuntary states which are harmless, and vicious or morbid emotions. In all such mental passions there is an element of intellect and will as well as of feeling. The primary passions are four --desire, fear, pain and pleasure; and one definition of passion is "an excessive impulse." To give way to such an impulse is to "assent" to it, or approve of it by a perverted act of judgement, and hence "passions" were called "judgements" by Chrysippus. The root of evil passions is "intemperance," "a defection of the whole mind from right Reason," and their fruits are the diseases of the soul we call vices and sins. The Ideal Wise Man or Sage, being moved only by rational emotions, is said to be "passionless." In him virtue and wisdom are personified. He only is happy and at peace with himself, unperturbed by fightings without or fears within, indifferent to externals, self-sufficient and self-controlled, master of his fate and captain of his soul. Their portrait of the Ideal Sage is one of the features of Stoicism which attracted world-wide attention, alike from critics and admirers of the School. Horace alludes to the sapiens more than once in his Satires, e.g. ii. 7. 83 ff. : quisnam igitur liber? sapiens sibi qui imperlosus, quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincula terrent, responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores fortis, et in se ipso totus, teres atque rotundus. Of "the Wise" it was said also that all were friends of all and that they had all things in common and that the whole world was their city and their home (whence the term "cosmopolitan"). They form one of the two classes into which mankind is divided -- the "good" and the "bad", the sheep and the goats. Here again we note the ingrained ethical dualism of the Stoic system. The "bad," the poor in virtue, we have always with us, a multitude whom no man can number, but where shall wisdom be found and who exactly are the truly "wise"? Socrates, they said, and Antisthenes and Diogenes approximated to the Ideal, but the perfect Sage is nowhere discoverable upon the earth ; either, then, he had his being in the far -- off Golden Age or he remains for ever a "pattern laid up in the heavens." I have enlarged thus much upon the details of Stoic doctrine because it is the type of Dogmatism which the Sceptics criticized most frequently and most severely. We pass on now to the Sceptics themselves.   Back to Table of Contents III. SCEPTICISM AND THE SCEPTICS A "Sceptic," in the original sense of the Greek term, is simply an "inquirer" or investigator. But inquiry often leads to an impasse, and ends in incredulity or despair of a solution, so that the "inquirer" becomes a "doubter" or a "disbeliever," and Scepticism receives its usual connotation. All down the history of Greek philosophy we have found traces of sceptical thought in the repeated discrediting of sense-perception and the frequent insistence on the folly of vulgar opinion. But, with the exception of Sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, all the philosophers agreed in assuming that truth existed and that knowledge of it was possible. When Scepticism was revived and reorganized under the name of "Pyrrhonism" its main task was to challenge this assumption and to maintain, if not the impossibility of knowledge, at least the impossibility of positively affirming its possibility. Its watchword was "Suspend judgement." The history of Scepticism, as a definite tradition or "School," may conveniently be divided into four periods or stages, viz. : (1) Practical Scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis (circa 360 - 275 B.C.), and his pupil Timon of Phlius (circa 315 - 225 B.C.). (2) Critical Scepticism and probabilism of the New Academy – Arcesilas of Pitane (circa 315 - 241 B.C.) and Carnades of Cyrene (circa 213 – 129 B.C.). This ended in the Eclecticism of Philo and Antiochus (ob. 69 B.C.). (3) Pyrrhonism revived, systematized and developed dialectically by Aenesidemus (circa 100 - 40 B.C.) and Agrippa (? first century A.D.). (4) Final development of Empiric Scepticism, culminating in Sextus Empiricus (circa 160 – 210 A.D.). A brief account of each of these stages must here suffice. 1. Pyrrho of Elis -- in spite of some later traditions about him -- was probably not at all a full-blown Sceptic, but rather a moralist of an austere and ascetic type -- as Cicero represents him (Acad. Pr. ii. 130, De Fin. iv. 43, 49) -- who cultivated insensibility to externals and superiority to environment. Probably he derived from Democritus a deep distrust of the value of sense-perception, but otherwise he seems to have been imbued with dogmatism, though it was the dogmatism of the will rather than of the intellect. We may fairly assume that the causes which led to the Scepticism of Pyrrho and his immediate followers were twofold -- firstly, the intellectual confusion which resulted from the number of conflicting doctrines and rival schools, and secondly, the political confusion and social chaos which spread through the Hellenic world after Alexander's death, together with the new insight into strange habits and customs which was given by the opening up of the East. The natural result of the situation at the close of the fourth century was to shake men's belief in tradition and custom, to dissolve the old creeds and loyalties, and to produce the demand for a new way of salvation in the midst of a crumbling world. Pyrrho, it would seem, shared this attitude, and stood out as the apostle of disillusionment. He would not seek or promise "happiness," in the usual sense of the word, but he sought and taught the negative satisfaction of freedom from care and worrv by the cultivation of a neutral, noncommittal attitude towards all the problems of life and thought. In self-defence he sought refuge within himself, there to achieve a self-centred "apathy" which his disciples were to acclaim, under the name of "ataraxy," as the Chief End of Man. Probably, then, the main, if not the only, interest of Pyrrho was in the ethical and practical side of Scepticism as the speediest cure for the ills of life. Timon of Phlius spent the latter part of his long life at Athens. In his earlier days he is said to have sat under Stilpo at Megara, as well as under Pyrrho at Elis. His admiration for the latter was unbounded, although it would seem that he did not copy his ascetic habits too closely. He was a voluminous writer of both prose and poetry -- epics, tragedies, satires -- but only a few fragments of two of his works have survived, viz. the " Images " or "Illusions," and the "Silli" or "Lampoons." The latter evidently became very popular because of its mordant wit. It consisted of three books, all deriding the professors of philosophy, and written in hexameters in the Homeric style, beginning thus: Come now, listen to me, ye polypragmatical Sophists. The second and third books were in the form of a dialogue between Timon and Xenoplianes, in which the latter expresses his contempt for nearly all the rival schools of thought. It appears, then, that the only philosophers for whom Timon entertained any respect were the Eleatics, Democritus and Protagoras -- the most severe critics of knowledge in the form of sense-perception. This exposure of the futility of philosophizing served to support the indifferentist attitude of Pyrrho; and Timon by his writings (for Pyrrho wrote nothing) popularized the Sceptical view that the way to make the best of life is to eschew dogma and to cultivate mental repose. It is probably a mistake of Sextus (Adv. Math. iii. 2, vi. 66) to ascribe to Timon formal argumentation concerning "hypotheses" and the "divisibility of time," considering his ridicule of dialectic and his avoidance of "the strife of tongues"; and it is very doubtful whether he (or Pyrrbo) invented or used any of the technical vocabulary of Scepticism (e.g. "Suspension," "No more," " Equipollence") which is commonly ascribed to him or his master. 2. Scepticism in the New Academy (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 220 ff.). -- With Arcesilas Scepticism entered upon a new stage of development. It ceased to be purely practical, and became mainly theoretical. Arcesilas succeeded Crates as Head of the Academy about 270 B.C. He appears to have been influenced by the Megarics as well as by Pyrrho, and was eminent as a dialectician and controversialist. His delight was to argue in utramque partem and balance argument against argument; and he took up the position that to know we know is an impossibility, and to seek for absolute truth an absurdity. His polemic was chiefly directed against the Stoic epistemologyand its doctrine of the "apprehensive presentation" as the "Criterion." He maintained that we can "assent" to no sense-impression as carrying conviction and indubitably true, and that the objective realities are consequently incognizable, and we can only "suspend judgement" about them, unless we content ourselves with fallible "opinion" instead of scientific "knowledge." But the Stoic "Sage" never "opines"; neither can he "know"; therefore he must suspend judgement and turn Sceptic. False and true presentations are indistinguishable: no valid criterion exists: we have no guide but opinion, and we can only think, believe, and act in accordance with what seems reasonable or probably right. Thus, while Pyrrho had renounced and Timon flouted the Dogmatics, Arcesilas started the practice of refuting them scientifically and systematically, and earned thereby the abuse of Timon for his lapse from pure Pyrrhonism. Carneades of Cyrene, like Arcesilas and Pyrrho, left no writings, but his views were preserved by his disciple Cleitomachus (Hasdrubal). He was a brilliant teacher, a formidable dialectician, and perhaps the most talented philosopher of the post-Aristotelian period. His energies were mainly devoted to negative criticism of the theories of the Dogmatists, especially the Stoics. He resumed and developed the arguments with which Arcesilas had attacked the Stoic theory of knowledge, and which Chrysippus had, in the mean-while, attempted to rebut. Neither the senses nor the reason, he argued, can supply any infallible "criterion": there is no specific difference between false "presentations" and true: beside any true presentation you can set a false one which is in no wise different. The dreamer, the drunkard, the madman have illusions of the truth of which they are convinced: you see two eggs or two hairs and cannot tell the one from the other: you cannot distinguish the true impression from the false, or assert that the one rather than the other is produced by a real object. It is in vain, then, to look to the senses for certainty; and it is equally vain to look to the reason since it (as the Stoics held) is wholly dependent on the senses and based on experience. Logic, the product of the reasoning faculty, is discredited because of the number of insoluble fallacies for which it is responsible -- such as "The Liar" ("The Cretan says ‘I lie’: is he a liar ?"), "The Cornutus" ("Have you shed your horns -- yes or no?"), "The Sorites" or Chain argument ("How many grains make a heap? Take 10, 20, 30, etc., away, is it still a heap ?"). Chrysippus when confronted with the Sorites in a dialectical discussion is said to have called a halt and refused to answer, thus giving in to the Sceptic by "suspending judgement." Reason is thus found to be as fallible as sensation, and certitude impossible. Carneades also attacked the Ethical system of the Stoics, exposing their inconsistency in saving that Virtue is directed to choosing the prime objects of natural desire while denying to these objects the name of "good." He criticized also their Theology, their doctrines of the Divine Nature, of Providence, of Divination and Prophecy. The Stoics were fond of appealing to the consensus gentium, or the universal belief in the existence of the gods: Carneades ridiculed that appeal. For how do we know that the belief is universal? And why appeal to the multitude who -- the Stoics tell us -- are all fools? why call in ignorance as judge? And as to divination and prognostication, they rest on no principles of science but are mere quackery and tricks of the trade. The God of the Stoics is an incredible Being because he is composed of contradictory attributes. If He is to be infinite, omniscient, all-good, and imperishable, He cannot be either composite or corporeal or animate or rationial or virtuous -- all such qualities belonging to objects which lie in the sphere of becoming and perishing. In support of their theory of Providence the Stoics brought forward evidences of design in Nature. Carneades retorted by quoting cases of snake-bites, and wrecks at sea. Reason, said the Stoics, is a gift of Providence to man: why then, replied Carneades, did not Providence see to it that the majority were endowed with a "right reason" instead of one that only enables them to outdo the brutes in brutishness? Only a few possess right reason; so the Stoic God must be miserly in his gifts! In all this the position of Carneades is purely agnostic. He does not wish to affirm a negative, but merely to show up the untenability of the Stoic dogmas, and to reassert as regards all departments of knowledge the impossibility of attaining absolute certitude. When the pretentious structure of the Stoics had been thus riddled by the arrows of Carneades, their Ideal Sage must have appeared but as a figment to many, and their anthropomorphic Deity as an incredible bundle of contradictions. But there was a constructive as well as a destructive side to the teaching of Carneades. He took over, modified, and developed the theory of Arcesilas that, despite the impossibility of objective knowledge, a sufficient ground for practical choice and action might be found in the "reasonable" or subjectively satisfying. He granted to the Stoics that some sense-impressions or opinions seem to the percipient superior to others, and this apparent superiority provided a sufficient reason for preference and consequential action. Impressions being thus subjectively distinguishable, judgements may be graded in value as more or less "persuasive" or "probable." Carneades then classified presentations in this way: (1) the apparently false; (2) the apparently true, which are of three grades -- (a) the probable in itself; (b) the probable and "uncontradicted" (i.e. by accompanying conditions); (c) the probable and uncontradicted and "closely scrutinized" or "tested." These apparently true impressions produce varying degrees of "conviction" and deserve proportionate "assent" of a relative kind -- the only kind of assent possible for the Sceptic who denies that objective certitude is attainable. In connexion with this doctrine of "probabilism" Carneades defended human freedom, in "assent," choice and action, as against the determinism of the Stoics with their rigid theory of Destiny and Necessity; and he subjected their doctrine on this subject to a searching criticism which exposed its inherent inconsistency. With Carneades the dialectical Scepticism of the New Academy came to an end. His successors, Philo of Larissa (ob. circa 80 B.C.) and Antiochus of Ascalon (ob. 69 B.C.), surrendered his theory of nescience, and reverted to a more dogmatic position. Both were Eclectics -- Antiochus so much so that he asserted the harmony, if not the practical identity, of the doctrines of the Academy with those of the Peripatetics and Stoics, and his teaching was a curious amalgam of them all. This tendency to doctrinal conflation continued to characterize the philosophers of the succeeding generations till the rise of Neoplatonism, excepting only those attached to the Epicurean School andthe Later Sceptics. 5. The first of the "Later Sceptics," who revived the original "Pyrrhonism," was Aenesidemus, a younger contemporary of Antiochus. Cnossus in Crete may have been his birthplace, Alexandria was where he taught. Though originally an Academic, he denounced Arcesilas and Carneades as dogmatists in disguise rather than true Sceptics, since we cannot know that knowledge is impossible. His treatise Pyrrhoean Discourses consisted of eight books in which he explained his dissent from the New Academy, and criticized in detail the logic, ethics, and Physics of Stoicism. In another work, Introductory Outline of Pyrrhonism, he set forth his famous "Ten Tropes," or "Modes" of procedure, for the refuting of Dogmatism in all its forms. Apparently the order in which they are drawn up was not fixed, since Sextus's order differs from that of Diogenes Laertius; nor does it seem to be governed by any logical principle. The Tropes themselves merely formulate arguments in favour of the relativity of knowledge, borrowed from earlier Sceptical teachers -- Sophists, Megarics, Academics; and, as Lotze says, "The ten tropes, or logical grounds of doubt, all come to this, that sensations by themselves cannot discover to us what is the nature of the object which excites them." Besides these ten Tropes, Aenesidemus (in his Pyrrhonean Discourses, bk. 5) summarized the arguments against causality and current theories of "cause" in his "Eight (Aetiological) Tropes." These form a list of fallacious methods of reasoning about "cause." His objections rest mainly on the assumption that "cause" is a thing in itself, and causality a real objective quality inherent therein. Similarly he attacked the Stoic and Epicurean doctrine of "Signs," or "effects" which point back to "causes," arguing that no phenomenon can safely be regarded as a "sign," because "doctors differ" in interpreting symptoms. But, to judge by several remarks of Sextus, Aenesidemus was not consistent in his Scepticism. We are told that he regarded "the Sceptic system as a road leading to the Heracleitean philosophy, on the ground that the (Sceptic) view that opposites apparently belong to the same object is prefatory to the (Heracleitean) view that they really so belong." We are told also that he held that the primary world principle is air, which he identified with time and number; and that he explained the origin of the world in all its variety from this unitary substance by supposing it to be receptive of opposite qualities, and every whole self-identical in all its parts. He is also said to have reduced the six kinds of motion distinguished by Aristotle, and the ten of Plato, to two, viz. locomotion and alteration or transformation; and a peculiar theory of Soul, or reason, is ascribed to him, according to which the reason exists outside the body and is somehow inspired so that it can act from within through the senses. With the theory of reason as external, and therefore not individualized but "common," like the "Logos" of Heracleitus, is connected the further theory, ascribed to Aenesidemus, that some phenomena appear alike to all men "in common," while others appear different to different percipients, and that the former class are "true," the latter " false " -- universality of experience thus being the "Criterion" of truth. How we are to reconcile this hybrid dogmatism with the undoubted Pyrrhonism of Aenesidemus is a puzzling question which has much exercised the historians of philosopby. It has been suggested that Sextus has misunderstood or misrepresented Aenesidemus; or that Aenesidemus did ultimately pass over from the Sceptical to the Dogmatic position; or that his apparent Dogmatism can be explained away, as no real surrender of Scepticism but rather an unconscious yielding to the Eclectic influences of his intellectual environment. None of these suggestions seems wholly satisfactory; but perhaps the least difficult supposition is that Sextus is unintentionally misrepresenting Aenesidemus by a loose use of language when he ascribes the dogmas mentioned above to "Aenesidemus and his followers." If so, we may suppose that while Aenesidemus may have given a start to the dogmatizing tendency by enlarging on the points of similarity between Scepticism and Heracleiteanism and claiming Heracleitus as a forerunner, certain of his adherents pushed that tendency to excess and indulged in an Eclectic dogmatism, after the fashion of Antiochus, which blended Scepticism with Heracleitean and Stoic doctrine. Of the successors of Aenesidemus we know no more than the names until we come to Agrippa, about a century later. To him is attributed the presentation of Sceptical theory in "five Tropes," which are briefly these: (1) Based on the conflict among opinions; (2) Every proof requires a fresh proof in endless regress; (3) Based on the relativity of perceptions; (4) Proof must not presuppose unproved premisses; (5)Reasoning involves a vicious circle. Of these (1) and (3) resume and sum up the former "ten Tropes," which exhibited the fallibility of the senses and the relativity of perceptual knowledge; while (2), (4) and (5) are directed against the Aristotelian theory of "immediate" axioms and the possibility of logical demonstration. Agrippa was followed by Zeuxippus, Zeuxis, and Antiochus, who remain mere names, though we may suppose that they adhered to the tradition of dialectical Scepticism. 4. The last stage in the history of Greek Scepticism is marked by its alliance with medical empiricism (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. i. 236 ff.). Menodotus of Nicomedia and Theodas appear to have been the first of these medical Sceptics, and we may date them about A.D. 150. Galen criticizes the views of both regarding medicine and natural science. Herodotus of Tarsus, who succeeded Menodotus, is thought to have belonged to the "pneumatic" rather than to the "empiric" school of medicine; but in any case he was the teacher of Sextus Empiricus. To one or other of the foregoing Sceptics we may probably attribute two further developments of doctrine, viz. a further reduction of the "Tropes" to two (arguing against the possibility of either immediate or mediate certitude), and a new distinction between "commemorative and "indicative signs " (cf. Pyrr. Hyp. ii. 99). Sextus Empiricus (circa A.D. 200) is our main authority for the history and doctrine of the Sceptic School. We know that he was a Greek physician and that he succeded Herodotus as Head of the School, but we know little else about the details of his life. He seems to have resided for some time in Rome, and to have been acquainted with Athens and Alexandria. Although named "Empiricus" he seems to imply that he adhered rather to the "methodic" than to the "empiric" tradition in medicine. His surviving works are three -- (1) "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" in three books; (2) "Against the Dogmatists in five books, --l and 2 "Against the Logicians," 3 and 4 "Against the Physicists," 5 "Against the Ethicists"; (3) "Against the Professors" in six books -- a book each against Grammarians, Rhetors, Geometers, Arithmeticians, Astrologers, Musicians, in this order. Other works ascribed to him are a treatise "On the Soul" and "Notes on Medicine." Of the surviving works the Hypotyposes, or " Outlines," is a kind of summary of Scepticism, the first book stating and defending the Sceptic position, and the other two books attacking the Dogmatic position. The other two works are usually put together as a whole under the title Adversus Mathematicos -- which we might construe "Against the Professors of all Arts and Sciences," -- and they resume and expand the critical and polemical arguments of books 2 and 3 of the "Outlines." Probably there is but little original matter in these works. Sextus was mainly a compiler: he drew freely on the writings of his predecessors, especially Aensidemus, Cleitomachus (for Carneades), and Menodotus. He was evidently interested in the history of thought, and provides us with much valuable information about the earlier Schools, although he is not wholly reliable. He writes mostly in a plain, dry style, enlivened but rarely by touches of humour. As a controversialist he studies fairness by quoting the opponent's own views, often at great length; but he wearies the reader by his way of piling argument upon argument for the mere sake of multiplying words -- bad argument and good heaped togetherindiscriminately. Obviously his books are not intended to be works of art, but rather immense arsenals stored with all the weapons of offence and defence of every conceivable pattern, old and new, that ever were forged on the anvil of Scepticism by the hammer blows of Eristic dialecticians. From these storehouses the Sceptic engaged in polemics may choose his weapon to suit his need; for (as Sextus naively observes) the Sceptic is a "philanthropic" person who spares his adversary by using against him only the minimum of force necessary to bowl him over, so that the weakest and most flimsy arguments have their uses as well as the weightiest. Or is Sextus here the veiled humorist?   Back to Table of Contents IV. TEXT AND EDITIONS The text of Sextus is derived from two main sources -- the Greek Manuscripts and a Latin Translation. For the Hypotyposes the most important MSS. -- as described by the latest editor, Mutschmann – are: M = Monac. gr. 439, late fourteenth century, containiting Pyrr. Hyp. L = Laur. 81. 11, dated A.D. 1465, containing all the works of Sextus. E = Parisinus 1964, late fifteenth century, containing all Sextus. A =Parisirtus 1963, dated 1534, containing all Sextus. B =Berol. Phill. 1518, dated 1542, nearly a duplicate of A. Of these, the last three seem to be closely akin, so that we have three main lines of MS. tradition, derived from the same Archetype, viz. M, L, and EAB. T denotes (in Mutschmann's notation, which is here followed) the Latin Translation, which is preserved in the MS. known as Parisinus lat. 14700 (fol. 83 - 132). It contains the whole of Sextus except for two omissions, viz. p. 51, 11 - 26, and p. 145, 3 - 160, 20. As it was first brought to light by C. Jourdain in 1888, earlier editors were ignorant of its existence, and it is only in the latest Teubner edition that its readings are reported. The Teubner editor, H. Mutselimann, dates it in the thirteenth century, and regards it as equal in importance to any of the Greek MSS., and derived from an independent Archetype. There are three early editions of Sextus -- by P. and J. Choiet (Geneva, 1621); by J. A. Fabricius (Leipzig, 1718), incorporating the Latin version by H. Stephens (Paris, 1562), as well as additional Notes; by I. Bekker (Berlin, 1842), giving the text and index only. The first volume of the Teubner edition (containing Pyrr. Hyp.) was published in 1912, the second volume in 1914. A literal German version of the three books of Pyrr. Hyp., with an Introduction and useful Notes, by E. Pappenheim, appeared in 1877 (Leipzig); and an English version of Pyrr. Hyp., book i., is included in M. Patrick's volume Sextus Einpiricus and Greek Scepticism (Cambridge, 1899). The latest considerable contribution to the textual criticism of Sextus is Werner Heintz's Studien zu Sexius Empiricus (Halle, 1932). The present four volumes include "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (in Vol. I); "Against the Logicians" (Vol. II); "Against the Physicists" and "Against the Ethicists" (Vol. III); and "Against the Professors" (Vol. IV). "Against the Professors" vii - xi (Adversus Mathematicos vii – xi) is an alternative title for "Against the Logicians" I - v (Adversus Dogmaticos i - v). The text in these volumes is based on that of Bekker. Bekker, it may be noted, omitted both the Tables of Contents prefixed to the several books in the MSS. and the corresponding Chapter-headings, although the earlier editors had retained both. In these volumes the Chapter-headings are restored, for the convenience of the reader, while the Tables of Contents are, after Bekker, omitted, as a superfluous duplication. In addition to the accounts of Greek Scepticism given in the standard Histories of Ancient Philosophy, attention may be drawn to the special treatment of the subject in The Greek Sceptics by N. MacColl (1869); Les Sceptiques grecs by V. Brochard (1887), copious and clear; Die Geschichte des griechischen Skeptizismus by A. Goedeckemeyer (1905), good for details; Stoic and Epicurean by R. D. Hicks (1910), chapters 8 and 10; Stoics and Sceptics by E. Bevan (1913), less detailed, but scholarly, suggestive and interesting, and thus probably the best introduction to the subject for the general reader. Back to Table of Contents OUTLINES OF PYRRHONISM BOOK I   CHAPTER I. -- OF THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC SYSTEMS The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators either discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be inapprehensible or persist in their search. So, too, with regard to the objects investigated by philosophy, this is probably why some have claimed to have discovered the truth, others have asserted that it cannot be apprehended, while others again go on inquiring. Those who believe, they have discovered it are the "Dogmatists," specially so called -- Aristotle, for example, and Epicurus and the Stoics and certain others; Cleitomachus and Carneades and other Academics treat it as inapprehensible: the Sceptics keep on searching. Hence it seems reasonable to hold that the main types of philosophy are three -- the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Of the other systems it will best become others to speak: our task it present is to describe in outline the Sceptic doctrines first premising that of none of our future statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us at the moment.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER II. -- OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SCEPTICISM Of the Sceptic philosophy one argument (or branch of exposition) is called "general," the other "special." In the general argument we set forth the distinctive features of Scepticism, stating its purport and principles, its logical methods, criterion, and end or aim; the "Tropes," also, or "Modes," which lead to suspension of judgement, and in what sense we adopt the Sceptic formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the philosophies which stand next to it. In the special argument we state our objections regarding the several divisions of so-called philosophy. Let us, then, deal first with the general argument, beginning our description with the names given to the Sceptic School.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER III. -- OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF SCEPTICISM The Sceptic School, then, is also called "Zetetic" from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and "Ephectic" or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and "Aporetic" or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting and seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and "Pyrrhonean" from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER IV. -- WHAT SCEPTICISM IS Scepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgements in any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the objects and reasons thus opposed, we are brought firstly to a state of mental suspense and next to a state of "unperturbedness" or quietude. Now we call it an "ability" not in any subtle sense, but simply in respect of its "being able." By "appearances" we now mean the objects of sense-perception, whence we contrast them with the objects of thought or "judgements." The phrase "in any way whatsoever" can be connected either with the word "ability," to make us take the word "ability," as we said, in its simple sense, or with the phrase "opposing appearances to judgements"; for inasmuch as we oppose these in a variety of ways – appearances to appearances, or judgements to judgements, or alternando appearances to judgements, -- in order to ensure the inclusion of all these antitheses we employ the phrase "in any way whatsoever." Or, again, we join "in any way whatsoever" to "appearances and judgements" in order that we may not have to inquire how the appearances appear or how the thought-objects are judged, but may take these terms in the simple sense. The phrase "opposed judgements" we do not employ in the sense of negations and affirmations only but simply as equivalent to "conflicting judgements." "Equipollence" we use of equality in respect of probability and improbability, to indicate that no one of the conflicting judgements takes precedence of any other as being more probable. "Suspense" is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Quietude" is an untroubled and tranquil condition of soul. And how quietude enters the soul along with suspension of judgement we shall explain in our chapter (XII.) "Concerning the End."   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER V. -- OF THE SCEPTIC In the definition of the system there is also implicitly included that of the Pyrrhonean philosopher: he is the man who participates in this "ability."   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER VI. -- OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SCEPTICISM The originating cause of Scepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining quietude. Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement of this question to attain quietude. The main basic principle of the Sceptic system is that of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition; for we believe that as a consequence of this we end by ceasing to dogmatize.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER VII. -- DOES THE SCEPTIC DOGMATIZE? When we say that the Sceptic refrains from dogmatizing we do not use the term "dogma," as some do, in the broader sense of "approval of a thing" for the Sceptic gives assent to the feelings which are the necessary results of sense-impressions, and he would not, for example, say when feeling hot or cold "I believe that I am not hot or cold"); but we say that "he does not dogmatize" using "dogma" in the sense, which some give it, of "assent to one of the non-evident objects of scientific inquiry"; for the Pyrrhonean philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident. Moreover, even in the act of enunciating the Sceptic formulae concerning things non-evident -- such as the formula "No more (one thing than another)," or the formula "I determine nothing," or any of the others which we shall presently mention he does not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the formula "All things are false" asserts the falsity of itself as well as of everything else, as does the formula "Nothing is true," so also the formula "No more" asserts that itself, like all the rest, is "No more (this than that)," and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other formulae we say the same. If then, while the dogmatizer posits the matter of his dogma as substantial truth, the Sceptic enunciates his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatize in his enunciation of them. And, most important of all, in his enunciation of these formulae he states what appears to himself and announces his own impression in an undogmatic way, without making any positive assertion regarding the external realities.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER VIII. -- HAS THE SCEPTIC A DOCTRINAL RULE? We follow the same lines in replying to the question "Has the Sceptic a doctrinal rule?" For if one defines a "doctrinal rule" as "adherence to a number of dogmas which are dependent both on one another and on appearances," and defines "dogma" as "assent to a nonevident proposition," then we shall say that he has not a doctrinal rule. But if one defines "doctrinal rule" as "procedure which, in accordance with appearance, follows a certain line of reasoning, that reasoning indicating how it is possible to seem to live rightly (the word 'rightly' being taken, not as referring to virtue only, but in a wider sense) and tending to enable one to suspend judgement, then we say that he has a doctrinal rule. For we follow a line of reasoning which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country and its laws and institutions, and to our own instinctive feelings.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER IX. -- DOES THE SCEPTIC DEAL WITH PHYSICS? We make a similar reply also to the question "Should the Sceptic deal with physical problems?" For while, on the one hand, so far as regards making, firm and positive assertions about any of the matters dogmatically treated in physical theory, we do not deal with physics; yet, on the other hand, in respect of our mode of opposing to every proposition an equal proposition and of our theory of quietude we do treat of physics. This, too, is the way in which we approach the logical and ethical branches of so-called "philosophy."   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER X. – DO THE SCEPTICS ABOLISH APPEARANCES? Those who say that "the Sceptics abolish appearances," or phenomena, seem to me to be unacquainted with the statements of our School. For, as we said above, we do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily; and these impressions are "the appearances." And when we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself but the account given of that appearance, -- and that is a different thing from questioning the appearance itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet (and this we grant, for we perceive sweetness through the senses), but whether it is also sweet in its essence is for us a matter of doubt, since this is not an appearance but a judgement regarding the appearance. And even if we do actually argue against the appearances, we do not propound such arguments with the intention of abolishing appearances, but by way of pointing out the rashness of the Dogmatists; for if reason is such a trickster as to all but snatch away the appearances from under our very eyes, surely we should view it with suspicion in the case of things non-evident so as not to display rashness by following it.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER XI. -- OF THE CRITERION OF SCEPTICISM That we adhere to appearances is plain from what we say about the Criterion of the Sceptic School. The word "Criterion" is used in two senses: in the one it means "the standard regulating belief in reality or unreality," (and this we shall discuss in our refutation); in the other it denotes the standard of action by conforming to which in the conduct of life we perform some actions and abstain from others; and it is of the latter that we are now speaking. The criterion, then, of the Sceptic School is, we say, the appearance, giving this name to what is virtually the sense-presentation. For since this lies in feeling and involuntary affection, it is not open to question. Consequently, no one, I suppose, disputes that the underlying object has this or that appearance; the point in dispute is whether the object is in reality such as it appears to be. Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, Another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER XII. -- WHAT IS THE END OF SCEPTICISM? Our next subject will be the end of the Sceptic system. Now an "end" is "that for which all actions or reasonings are undertaken, while it exists for the sake of none"; or, otherwise, "the ultimate object of appentency." We assert still that the Sceptic's End is quietude in respect of matters of opinion and moderate feeling in respect of things unavoidable. For the skeptic, having set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgment on the sense impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby, found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended judgment; and as he was thus in suspense there followed, as it happened, the state of quietude in respect of matters of opinion. For the man who opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted: when he is without the things which he deems good he believes himself to be tormented by things naturally bad and he pursues after the things which are, as he thinks, good; which when he has obtained he keeps falling into still more perturbations because of his irrational and immoderate elation, and in his dread of a change of fortune he uses every endeavor to avoid losing the things which he deems good. On the other hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed. The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance. We do not, however, suppose that the Sceptic is wholly untroubled; but we say that he is troubled by things unavoidable; for we grant that he is cold at times and thirsty, and suffers various affections of that kind. But even in these cases, whereas ordinary people are afflicted by two circumstances, -- namely, by the affections themselves and, in no less a degree, by the belief that these conditions are evil by nature, --the Sceptic, by his rejection of the added belief in the natural badness of all these conditions, escapes here too with less discomfort. Hence we say that, while in regard to matters of opinion the Sceptic's End is quietude, in regard to things unavoidable it is "moderate affection." But some notable Sceptics have added the further definition "suspension of judgment in investigations."   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER XIII. -- OF THE GENERAL MODES LEADING TO THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT Now that we have been saying that tranquillity follows on suspension of judgment, it will be our next task to explain how we arrive at this suspension. Speaking generally, one may say that it is the result of setting things in opposition. We oppose either appearances to appearances or objects of thought to objects of thought or alternando. For instance, we oppose appearances to appearances when we say "The same tower appears round from a distance, but square from close at hand"; and thoughts to thoughts, when in answer to him who argues the existence of providence from the order of the heavenly bodies we oppose the fact that often the good fare ill and the bad fare well, and draw from this the inference that providence does not exist. And thoughts we oppose to appearances, as when Anaxagoras countered the notion that snow is white with the argument, "Snow is frozen water, and water is black; therefore snow also is black." With a different idea we oppose things present sometimes to things present, as in the foregoing examples, and sometimes to things past or future, as, for instance, when someone propounds to us a theory which we are unable to refute, we say to him in reply, "Just as, before the birth of the founder of the school to which you belong, the theory it holds was not as yet apparent as a sound theory, although it was really in existence, so likewise it is possible that the opposite theory to that which you now propound is already existent, though not yet apparent to us, so that we ought not as yet to yield assent to this theory which at the moment seems to be valid." But in order that we may have a more exact understanding of these antitheses I will describe the modes by which suspension of judgment is brought about, but without making any positive assertion regarding either their number or their validity; for it is possible that they may be unsound or there may be more of them than I shall enumerate.   Back to Table of Contents CHAPTER XIV. -- CONCERNING THE TEN MODES The usual tradition amongst the older skeptics is that the "modes" by which "suspension" is supposed to be brought about are ten in number; and they also give them the synonymous names of "arguments" and "positions." They are these: the first, based on the variety in animals; the second, on the differences in human beings; the third, on the different structures of the organs of sense; the fourth, on the circumstantial conditions; the fifth, on positions and intervals and locations; the sixth, on intermixtures; the seventh, on the quantities and formations of the underlying objects; the eighth, on the fact of relativity; the ninth, on the frequency or rarity of occurrence; the tenth, on the disciplines and customs and laws, the legendary beliefs and the dogmatic convictions. This order, however, we adopt without prejudice. As superordinate to these there stand three Modes -- that based on the subject who judges, that on the object judged, and that based on both. The first four of the ten Modes are subordinate to the Mode based on the subject (for the subject which judges is either an animal or a man or a sense, and existent in some condition): the seventh and tenth Modes are referred to that based on the object judged: the fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth are referred to the Mode based on both subject and object. Furthermore, these three Modes are also referred to that of relation, so that the Mode of relation stands as the highest genus, and the three as species, and the ten as subordinate subspecies. We give this as the probable account of their numbers; and as to their argumentative force what we say is this: The First argument (or Trope), as we said, is that which shows that the same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences in animals. This we infer both from the differences in their origins and from the variety of their bodily structures. Thus, as to origin, some animals are produced without sexual union, others by coition. And of those produced without coition, some come from fire, like the animalcules which appear in furnaces, others from putrid water, like gnats; others from wine when it turns sour, like ants; others from earth, like grasshoppers; others from marsh, like frogs; others from mud, like worms; others from asses, like beetles; others from greens, like caterpillars; others from fruits, like the gall-insects in wild figs; others from rotting animals, as bees from bulls and wasps from horses. Of the animals generated by coition, some -- in fact the majority -- come from homogeneous parents, others from heterogeneous parents, as do mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, like men; others are born as eggs, like birds; and yet others as lumps of flesh, like bears. It is natural, then, that these dissimilar and variant modes of birth should produce much contrariety of sense affection, and that this is a source of its divergent, discordant, and conflicting character. Moreover, the differences found in the most important parts of the body, and especially in those of which the natural function is judging and perceiving, are capable of producing a vast deal of divergence in the sense-impressions [owing to the variety in the animals]. Thus, sufferers from jaundice declare that objects which seem to us white are yellow, while those whose eyes are bloodshot call them blood-red. Since, then, some animals have eyes which are yellow, others bloodshot, others albino, others of other colors, they probably, I suppose, have different perceptions of color. Moreover, if we bend down over a book after having gazed long and fixedly at the sun, the letters seem to us to be golden in color and circling round. Since, then, some animals possess also a natural brilliance in their eyes, and emit from them a fine and mobile stream of light, so that they can even see by night, we seem bound to suppose that they are differently affected from us by external objects. Jugglers, too, by means of smearing lamp wicks with the rust of copper or with the juice of the cuttlefish make the bystanders appear now copper-colored and now black -- and that by just a small sprinkling of extra matter. Surely, then, we have much more reason to suppose that when different juices are intermingled in the vision of animals their impressions of the objects will become different. Again, when we press the eyeball at one side the forms, figures, and sizes of the objects appear oblong and narrow. So it is probable that all animals which have the pupil of the eye slanting and elongated such as goats, cats, and similar animals -- have impressions of the objects which are different and unlike the notions formed of them by the animals which have round pupils. Mirrors, too, owing to differences in their construction, represent the external objects at one time as very small -- as when the mirror is concave, -- at another time as elongated and narrow -- as when the mirror is convex. Some mirrors, too, show the head of the figure reflected at the bottom and the feet at the top. Since, then, some organs of sight actually protrude beyond the face owing to their convexity, while others are quite concave, and others again lie in a level plane, on this account also it is probable that their impressions differ, and that the same objects, as seen by dogs, fishes, lions, men, and locusts, are neither equal in size nor similar in shape, but vary according to the image of each object created by the particular sight that receives the impression. Of the other sense organs also the same account holds good. Thus, in respect of touch, how could one maintain that creatures covered with shells, with flesh, with prickles, with feathers, with scales, are all similarly affected? And as for the sense of hearing, how could we say that its perceptions are alike in animals with a very narrow auditory passage and those with a very wide one, or in animals with hairy ears and those with smooth ears? For, as regards this sense, even we ourselves find our hearing affected in one way when we have our ears plugged and in another way when we use them just as they are. Smell also will differ because of the variety in animals. For if we ourselves are affected in one way when we have a cold and our internal phlegm is excessive, and in another way when the parts about our head are filled with an excess of blood, feeling an aversion to smells which seem sweet to everyone else and regarding them as noxious, it is reasonable to suppose that animals too -- since some are flaccid by nature and rich in phlegm, others rich in blood, others marked by a predominant excess of yellow or of black gall -- are in each case impressed in different ways by the objects of smell. So too with the objects of taste; for some animals have rough and dry tongues, others extremely moist tongues. We ourselves, too, when our tongues are very dry, in cases of fever, think the food proffered us to be earthy and ill-flavored or bitter -- an affection due to the variation in the predominating juices which we are said to contain. Since, then, animals also have organs of taste which differ and which have different juices in excess, in respect of taste also they will receive different impressions of the real objects. For just as the same food when digested becomes in one place a vein, in another an artery, in another a bone, in another a sinew, or some other piece of the body, displaying a different potency according to the difference in the parts which receive it; -- and just as the same unblended water, when it is absorbed by trees, becomes in one place bark, in another branch, in another blossom, and so finally fig and quince and each of the other fruits; -- and just as the single identical breath of a musician breathed into a flute becomes here a shrill note and there a deep note, and the same pressure of his hand on the lyre produces here a deep note and there a shrill note, -- so likewise is it probable that the external objects appear different owing to differences in the structure of the animals which experience the sense-impressions. But one may learn this more clearly from the preferences and aversions of animals. Thus, sweet oil seems very agreeable to men, but intolerable to beetles and bees; and olive oil is beneficial to men, but when poured on wasps and bees it destroys them; and seawater is a disagreeable and poisonous potion for men, but fish drink and enjoy it. Pigs, too, enjoy wallowing in the stinking mire rather than in clear and clean water. And whereas some animals eat grass, others eat shrubs, others feed in the woods, others live on seeds or flesh or milk; some of them, too, prefer their food high, others like it fresh, and while some prefer it raw, others like it cooked. And so generally, the things which are agreeable to some are to others disagreeable, distasteful, and deadly. Thus, quails are fattened by hemlock, and pigs by henbane; and pigs also enjoy eating salamanders, just as deer enjoy poisonous creatures, and swallows gnats. So ants and wood lice, when swallowed by men, cause distress and gripings, whereas the bear, whenever she falls sick, cures herself by licking them up. The mere touch of an oak twig paralyses the viper, and that of a plane leaf the bat. The elephant flees from the ram, the lion from the cock, sea monsters from the crackle of bursting beans, and the tiger from the sound of a drum. One might, indeed, cite many more examples, but --not to seem unduly prolix -- if the same things are displeasing to some but pleasing to others, and pleasure and displeasure depend upon sense impression, then animals receive different impressions from the underlying objects. But if the same things appear different owing to the variety in animals, we shall, indeed, be able to state our own impressions of the real object, but as to its essential nature we shall suspend judgment. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, since we ourselves are involved in the dispute and are, therefore, rather in need of a judge than competent to pass judgment ourselves. Besides, we are unable, either with or without proof, to prefer our own impressions to those of the irrational animals. For in addition to the probability that proof is, as we shall show, a nonentity, the so-called proof itself will be either apparent to us or non-apparent. If, then, it is non-apparent, we shall not accept it with confidence; while if it is apparent to us, inasmuch as what is apparent to animals is the point in question and the proof is apparent to us who are animals, it follows that we shall have to question the proof itself as to whether it is as true as it is apparent. It is, indeed, absurd to attempt to establish the matter in question by means of the matter in question, since in that case the same thing will be at once believed and disbelieved, -- believed in so far as it purports to prove, but disbelieved in so far as it requires proof, -- which is impossible. Consequently we shall not possess a proof which enables us to give our own sense impressions the preference over those of the so-called irrational animals. If, then, owing to the variety in animals their sense impressions differ, and it is impossible to judge between them, we must necessarily suspend judgment regarding the external underlying objects. By way of super-addition, too, we draw comparisons between mankind and the so-called irrational animals in respect of their sense impressions. For, after our solid arguments, we deem it quite proper to poke fun at those conceited braggarts, the Dogmatists. As a rule, our school compare the irrational animals in the mass with mankind, but since the Dogmatists captiously assert that the comparison is unequal, we – super-adding yet more -- will carry our ridicule further and base our argument on one animal only, the dog for instance if you like, which is held to be the most worthless of animals. For even in this case we shall find that the animals we are discussing are no wise inferior to ourselves in respect of the credibility of their impressions. Now it is allowed by the Dogmatists that this animal, the dog, excels us in point of sensation: as to smell it is more sensitive than we are, since by this sense it tracks beasts that it cannot see; and with its eyes it sees them more quickly than we do; and with its ears it is keen of perception. Next let us proceed with the reasoning faculty. Of reason one kind is internal, implanted in the soul, the other externally expressed. Let us consider first the internal reason. Now according to those Dogmatists who are, at present, our chief opponents -- I mean the Stoics -- internal reason is supposed to be occupied with the following matters: the choice of things congenial and the avoidance of things alien; the knowledge of the arts contributing thereto; the apprehension of the virtues pertaining to one's proper nature and of those relating to the passions. Now the dog -- the animal upon which, by way of example, we have decided to base our argument -- exercises choice of the congenial and avoidance of the harmful, in that it hunts after food and slinks away from a raised whip. Moreover, it possesses an art which supplies that which is congenial, namely hunting. Nor is it devoid even of virtue; for certainly if justice consists in rendering to each his due, the dog that welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but drives off strangers and evildoers, cannot be lacking in justice. But if he possesses this virtue, then, since the virtues are interdependent, he possesses also all the other virtues; and these, say the philosophers, the majority of men do not possess. That the dog is also valiant we see by the way he repels attacks, and intelligent as well, as Homer too testified when he sang how Odysseus went unrecognized by all the people of his own household and was recognized only by the dog Argus, who neither was deceived by the bodily alterations of the hero nor had lost his original apprehensive impression, which indeed he evidently retained better than the men. And according to Chrysippus, who shows special interest in irrational animals, the dog even shares in the far-famed "Dialectic." This person, at any rate, declares that the dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without stopping to smell. For, says the old writer, the dog implicitly reasons thus: "The creature went either by this road, or by that, or by the other: but it did not go by this road or by that: therefore it went by the other." Moreover, the dog is capable of comprehending and assuaging his own sufferings; for when a thorn has got stuck in his foot he hastens to remove it by rubbing his foot on the ground and by using his teeth. And if he has a wound anywhere, because dirty wounds are hard to cure whereas clean ones heal easily, the dog gently licks off the pus that has gathered. Nay more, the dog admirably observes the prescription of Hippocrates: rest being what cures the foot, whenever he gets his foot hurt he lifts it up and keeps it as far as possible free from pressure. And when distressed by unwholesome humors he eats grass, by the help of which he vomits what is unwholesome and gets well again. If, then, it has been shown that the animal upon which, as an example, we have based our argument not only chooses the wholesome and avoids the noxious, but also possesses an art capable of supplying what is wholesome, and is capable of comprehending and assuaging its own sufferings, and is not devoid of virtue, then -- these being the things in which the perfection of internal reasons consists -- the dog will be thus far perfect. And that, I suppose, is why certain of the professors of philosophy have adorned themselves with the title of this animal. Concerning external reason, or speech, it is unnecessary for the present to inquire; for it has been rejected even by some of the Dogmatists as being a hindrance to the acquisition of virtue, for which reason they used to practice silence during the period of instruction; and besides, supposing that a man is dumb, no one will therefore call him irrational. But to pass over these cases, we certainly see animals -- the subject of our argument -- uttering quite human cries, -- jays, for instance, and others. And, leaving this point also aside, even if we do not understand the utterances of the so-called irrational animals, still it is not improbable that they converse although we fail to understand them; for in fact when we listen to the talk of barbarians we do not understand it, and it seems to us a kind of uniform chatter. Moreover, we hear dogs uttering one sound when they are driving people off, another when they are howling, and one sound when beaten, and a quite different sound when fawning. And so in general, in the case of all other animals as well as the dog, whoever examines the matter carefully will find a great variety of utterance according to the different circumstances, so that, in consequence, the so-called irrational animals may justly be said to participate in external reason. But if they neither fall short of mankind in the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in internal reason, nor yet (to go still further) in external reason, or speech, then they will deserve no less credence than ourselves in respect of their sense impressions. Probably, too, we may reach this conclusion by basing our argument on each single class of irrational animals. Thus, for example, who would deny that birds excel in quickness of wit or that they employ external reason? For they understand not only present events but future events as well, and these they foreshow to such as are able to comprehend them by means of prophetic cries as well as by other signs. I have drawn this comparison (as I previously indicated) by way of super-addition, having already sufficiently proved, as I think, that we cannot prefer our own sense impressions to those of the irrational animals. If, however, the irrational animals are not less worthy of credence than we in regard to the value of sense impressions, and their impressions vary according to the variety of animal, -- then, although I shall be able to say what the nature of each of the underlying objects appears to me to be, I shall be compelled, for the reasons stated above, to suspend judgment as to its real nature. Such, then, is the First of the Modes which induce suspense. The Second Mode is, as we said, that based on the differences in men; for even if we grant for the sake of argument that men are more worthy of credence than irrational animals, we shall find that even our own differences of themselves lead to suspense. For man, you know, is said to be compounded of two things, soul and body, and in both these we differ one from another. Thus, as regards the body, we differ in our figures and "idiosyncrasies," or constitutional peculiarities. The body of an Indian differs in shape from that of a Scythian; and it is said that what causes the variation is a difference in the predominant humors. Owing to this difference in the predominant humors the sense impressions also come to differ, as we indicated in our first argument. So too in respect of choice and avoidance of external objects men exhibit great differences: thus Indians enjoy some things, our people other things, and the enjoyment of different things is an indication that we receive varying impressions from the underlying objects. In respect of our "idiosyncrasies," our differences are such that some of us digest the flesh of oxen more easily than rockfish, or get diarrhea from the weak wine of Lesbos. An old wife of Attica, they say, swallowed with impunity thirty drams of hemlock, and Lysis took four drams of poppy juice without hurt. Demophon, Alexander's butler, used to shiver when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade: Athenagoras the Argive took no hurt from the stings of scorpions and poisonous spiders; and the Psyllaeans, as they are called, are not harmed by bites from snakes and asps, nor are the Tentyritae of Egypt harmed by the crocodile. Further, those Ethiopians who live beyond Lake Meroe on the banks of the river Astapous eat with impunity scorpions, snakes, and the like. Rufinus of Chalcis when he drank hellebore neither vomited nor suffered at all from the purging, but swallowed and digested it just like any other ordinary drink. Chrysermus the Herophilean doctor was liable to get a heart attack if ever he took pepper; and Soterichus the surgeon was seized with diarrhea whenever he smelled fried sprats. Andron the Argive was so immune from thirst that he actually traversed the waterless country of Libya without needing a drink. Tiberius Caesar could see in the dark, and Aristotle tells of a Thasian who fancied that the image of a man was continually going in front of him. Seeing, then, that men vary so much in body -- to content ourselves with but a few instances of the many collected by the Dogmatists, -- men probably also differ from one another in respect of the soul itself, for the body is a kind of expression of the soul, as in fact is proved by the science of Physiognomy. But the greatest proof of the vast and endless differences in men's intelligence is the discrepancy in the statements of the Dogmatists concerning the right objects of choice and avoidance, as well as other things. Regarding this the poets, too, have expressed themselves fittingly. Thus Pindar says: The crowns and trophies of his storm-foot steeds Give joy to one; yet others find it joy To dwell in gorgeous chambers gold-bedeckt; Some even take delight in voyaging O'er ocean's billows in a speeding barque. And the poet [Homer] says: "One thing is pleasing to one man, another thing to another." Tragedy, too, is full of such sayings; for example: Were fair and wise the same thing unto all, There had been no contentious quarrelling. And again: Tis strange that the same thing abhorrd by some Should give delight to others. Seeing, then, that choice and avoidance depend on pleasure and displeasure, while pleasure and displeasure depend on sensation and sense-impression, whenever some men choose the very things which are avoided by others, it is logical for us to conclude that they are also differently affected by the same things, since otherwise they would all alike have chosen or avoided the same things. But if the same objects affect men differently owing to the differences in the men, then, on this ground also, we shall reasonably be led to suspension of judgment. For while we are, no doubt, able to state what each of the underlying objects appears to be, relatively to each difference, we are incapable of explaining what it is in reality. For we shall have to believe either all men or some. But if we believe all, we shall be attempting the impossible and accepting contradictories; and if some, let us be told whose opinions we are to endorse. For the Platonist will say "Plato's", the Epicurean, "Epicurus's" -- and so on with the rest; and thus by their unsettled disputations they will bring us round again to a state of suspense. Moreover, he who maintains that we ought to assent to the majority is making a childish proposal, since no one is able to visit the whole of mankind and determine what pleases the majority of them -- for there may possibly be races of whom we know nothing amongst whom conditions rare with us are common, and conditions common with us rare, -- possibly, for instance, most of them feel no pain from the bites of spiders, though a few on rare occasions feel such pain; and so likewise with the rest of the "idiosyncrasies" mentioned above. Necessarily, therefore, the differences in men afford a further reason for bringing in suspension of judgment. When the Dogmatists -- a self-loving class of men -- assert that in judging things they ought to prefer themselves to other people, we know that their claim is absurd; for they themselves are a party to the controversy; and if, when judging appearances, they have already given the preference to themselves, then, by thus entrusting themselves with the judgment, they are begging the question before the judgment is begun. Nevertheless, in order that we may arrive at suspension of judgment by basing our argument on one person -- such as, for example, their visionary "Sage" -- we adopt the Mode which comes Third in order. This Third Mode is, we say, based on differences in the senses. That the senses differ from one another is obvious. Thus, to the eye paintings seem to have recesses and projections, but not so to the touch. Honey, too, seems to some pleasant to the tongue but unpleasant to the eyes; so that it is impossible to say whether it is absolutely pleasant or unpleasant. The same is true of sweet oil, for it pleases the sense of smell but displeases the taste. So too with spurge: since it pains the eyes but causes no pain to any other part of the body, we cannot say whether, in its real nature, it is absolutely painful or painless to bodies. Rain-water, too, is beneficial to the eyes but roughens the windpipe and the lungs; as also does olive oil, though it mollifies the epidermis. The cramp-fish, also, when applied to the extremities produces cramp, but it can be applied to the rest of the body without hurt. Consequently we are unable to say what is the real nature of each of these things, although it is possible to say what each thing at the moment appears to be. A longer list of examples might be given, but to avoid prolixity, in view of the plan of our treatise, we will say just this. Each of the phenomena perceived by the senses seems to be a complex: the apple, for example, seems smooth, odorous, sweet, and yellow. But it is non-evident whether it really possesses these qualities only; or whether it has but one quality but appears varied owing to the varying structure of the sense organs; or whether, again, it has more qualities than are apparent, some of which elude our perception. That the apple has but one quality might be argued from what we said above regarding the food absorbed by bodies, and the water sucked up by trees, and the breath in flutes and pipes and similar instruments; for the apple likewise may be all of one sort but appear different owing to differences in the sense organs in which perception takes place. And that the apple may possibly possess more qualities than those apparent to us we argue in this way. Let us imagine a man who possesses from birth the senses of touch, taste, and smell, but can neither hear nor see. This man, then, will assume that nothing visual or audible has any existence, but only those three kinds of qualities which he is able to apprehend. Possibly, then, we also, having only our five senses, perceive only such of the apple's qualities as we are capable of apprehending; and possibly it may possess other underlying qualities which affect other sense organs, though we, not being endowed with those organs, fail to apprehend the sense objects which come through them. "But," it may be objected, "Nature made the senses commensurate with the objects of sense." What kind of "Nature"? we ask, seeing that there exists so much unresolved controversy amongst the Dogmatists concerning the reality which belongs to Nature. For he who decides the question as to the existence of Nature will be discredited by them if he is an ordinary person, while if he is a philosopher he will be a party to the controversy and therefore himself subject to judgment and not a judge. If, however, it is possible that only those qualities which we seem to perceive subsist in the apple, or that a greater number subsist, or, again, that not even the qualities which affect us subsist, then it will be non-evident to us what the nature of the apple really is. And the same argument applies to all the other objects of sense. But if the senses do not apprehend external objects, neither can the mind apprehend them; hence, because of this argument also, we shall be driven, it seems, to suspend judgment regarding the external underlying objects. In order that we may finally reach suspension by basing our argument on each sense singly, or even by disregarding the senses, we further adopt the Fourth Mode of suspension. This is the Mode based, as we say, on the "circumstances," meaning by "circumstances" conditions or dispositions. And this Mode, we say, deals with states that are natural or unnatural, with waking or sleeping, with conditions due to age, motion or rest, hatred or love, emptiness or fullness, drunkenness or soberness, predispositions, confidence or fear, grief or joy. Thus, according as the mental state is natural or unnatural, objects produce dissimilar impressions, as when men in a frenzy or in a state of ecstasy believe they hear demons' voices, while we do not. Similarly they often say that they perceive an odor of storax or frankincense, or some such scent, and many other things, though we fail to perceive them. Also, the same water which feels very hot when poured on inflamed spots seems lukewarm to us. And the same coat which seems of a bright yellow color to men with bloodshot eyes does not appear so to me. And the same honey seems to me sweet, but bitter to men with jaundice. Now should anyone say that it is an intermixture of certain humors which produces in those who are in an unnatural state improper impressions from the underlying objects, we have to reply that, since healthy persons also have mixed humors, these humors too are capable of causing the external objects -- which really are such as they appear to those who are said to be in an unnatural state -- to appear other than they are to healthy persons. For to ascribe the power of altering the underlying objects to those humors, and not to these, is purely fanciful; since just as healthy men are in a state that is natural for the healthy but unnatural for the sick, so also sick men are in a state that is unnatural for the healthy but natural for the sick, so that to these last also we must give credence as being, relatively speaking, in a natural state. Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different impressions, since we do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we imagine when awake; so that the existence or non-existence of our impressions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking condition. Probably, then, in dreams we see things which to our waking state are unreal, although not wholly unreal; for they exist in our dreams, just as waking realities exist although non-existent in dreams. Age is another cause of difference. For the same air seems chilly to the old but mild to those in their prime; and the same color appears faint to older men but vivid to those in their prime; and similarly the same sound seems to the former faint, but to the latter clearly audible. Moreover, those who differ in age are differently moved in respect of choice and avoidance. For whereas children -- to take a case -- are all eagerness for balls and hoops, men in their prime choose other things, and old men yet others. And from this we conclude that differences in age also cause different impressions to be produced by the same underlying objects. Another cause why the real objects appear different lies in motion and rest. For those objects which, when we are standing still, we see to be motionless, we imagine to be in motion when we are sailing past them. Love and hatred are a cause, as when some have an extreme aversion to pork while others greatly enjoy eating it. Hence, too, Menander said: Mark now his visage, what a change is there Since he has come to this! How bestial! 'Tis actions fair that make the fairest face. Many lovers, too, who have ugly mistresses think them most beautiful. Hunger and satiety are a cause; for the same food seems agreeable to the hungry but disagreeable to the sated. Drunkenness and soberness are a cause; since actions which we think shameful when sober do not seem shameful to us when drunk. Predispositions are a cause; for the same wine which seems sour to those who have previously eaten dates or figs, seems sweet to those who have just consumed nuts or chickpeas; and the vestibule of the bathhouse, which warms those entering from outside, chills those coming out of the bathroom if they stop long in it. Fear and boldness are a cause; as what seems to the coward fearful and formidable does not seem so in the least to the bold man. Grief and joy are a cause; since the same affairs are burdensome to those in grief but delightful to those who rejoice. Seeing then that the dispositions also are the cause of so much disagreement, and that men are differently disposed at different times, although, no doubt, it is easy to say what nature each of the underlying objects appears to each man to possess, we cannot go on to say what its real nature is, since the disagreement admits in itself of no settlement. For the person who tries to settle it is either in one of the aforementioned dispositions or in no disposition whatsoever. But to declare that he is in no disposition at all -- as, for instance, neither in health nor sickness, neither in motion nor at rest, of no definite age, and devoid of all the other dispositions as well -- is the height of absurdity. And if he is to judge the sense-impressions while he is in some one disposition, he will be a party to the disagreement, and, moreover, he will not be an impartial judge of the external underlying objects owing to his being confused by the dispositions in which he is placed. The waking person, for instance, cannot compare the impressions of sleepers with those of men awake, nor the sound person those of the sick with those of the sound; for we assent more readily to things present, which affect us in the present, than to things not present. In another way, too, the disagreement of such impressions is incapable of settlement. For he who prefers one impression to another, or one "circumstance" to another, does so either uncritically and without proof or critically and with proof; but he can do this neither without these means (for then he would be discredited) nor with them. For if he is to pass judgment on the impressions he must certainly judge them by a criterion; this criterion, then, he will declare to be true, or else false. But if false, he will be discredited; whereas, if he shall declare it to be true, he will be stating that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. But if without proof, he will be discredited; and if with proof, it will certainly be necessary for the proof also to be true, to avoid being discredited. Shall he, then, affirm the truth of the proof adopted to establish the criterion after having judged it or without judging it? If without judging, he will be discredited; but if after judging, plainly he will say that he has judged it by a criterion; and of that criterion we shall ask for a proof, and of that proof again a criterion. For the proof always requires a criterion to confirm it, and the criterion also a proof to demonstrate its truth; and neither can a proof be sound without the previous existence of a true criterion nor can the criterion be true without the previous confirmation of the proof. So in this way both the criterion and the proof are involved in the circular process of reasoning, and thereby both are found to be untrustworthy; for since each of them is dependent on the credibility of the other, the one is lacking in credibility just as much as the other. Consequently, if a man can prefer one impression to another neither without a proof and a criterion nor with them, then the different impressions due to the differing conditions will admit of no settlement; so that as a result of this Mode also we are brought to suspend judgment regarding the nature of external realities. The Fifth Argument (or Trope) is that based on positions, distances, and locations; for owing to each of these the same objects appear different; for example, the same porch when viewed from one of its corners appears curtailed, but viewed from the middle symmetrical on all sides; and the same ship seems at a distance to be small and stationary, but from close at hand large and in motion; and the same tower from a distance appears round but from a near point quadrangular. These effects are due to distances; among effects due to locations are the following: the light of a lamp appears dim in the sun but bright in the dark; and the same oar bent when